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KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL
reserve notes are tangibles and Prick v. Pennsylvania is overruled,1
or 3) the transfer of property by gift in contemplation of death is
governed by rules which differ from those governing transfer by
succession, even though that succession takes place under a will."
The choice of any of these alternatives might give rise to embarrassing
questions.
M.Avmx M. TiNOHEn
CRIMINAL LAW-THE FELONY MURDER DOCTRINE IN
KENTUCKY*
The appellant willfully set fire to a dwelling at night, and as a
result an occupant was burned to death. Appellant was convicted of
murder on the ground that the death was the natural consequence
of the arson. He sought a new trial, alleging that the lower court
erred in refusing to submit to the jury the question of whether the
death of the occupant was a necessary or natural consequence of the
burning of the dwelling. In affirming the conviction the court said,
"There can be no doubt that the death of this child was the natural
consequence of burning the house; therefore, it was not necessary...
to submit this question for the determination of the jury." Whitfield v. Commonwealth, 278 Ky. 111, 128 S. W. (2d) 208 (1939).
In the case at bar the court seems to be in accord with its prior
holding in Red-dick v. Commonwealth,' but the case clarifies and explains the Kentucky Court's attitude toward the felony murder doctrine. Prior to the instant case, the Kentucky Court had held that
where a death ensues during the commission of a felony dangerous
to life, the felon was guilty of murder.2 The rule was not qualified
in any manner, and the popular conception has been that the felony
did not have to be the proximate cause of the death. But in the
case uder discussion, the court did consider proximate cause and
"Mr. Justice Stone cleverly avoids committing himself on this
point when he says (at 214), "there is nothing in the Constitution to
compel a state to treat federal reserve notes for tax purposes as
chattels were treated in Frick v. Pennsylvania . . ." It is unlikely,
however, that he would say that there is nothing in the Constitution
to compel a state to treat chattels as chattels were treated in Frick v.
Pennsylvania. He did not dissent in that case.
'Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. 'S. 473, 45 S. Ct. 603 (1925);
Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1, 48 S. Ct. 410 (1928).
* This comment is written in conjunction with the one immediately
following. The same case is considered in both. The writers reach
different conclusions.
117 Ky. Law Rep. 1020, 33 S. W. 416 (1895). The defendant set
fire to a hotel under cover of night and an occupant was burned to
death. The question of proximate cause was not presented on appeal,
but the court held that when one commits a dangerous felony and a
death ensues the felon is guilty of murder.
2Reddick v. Commonwealth, 17 Ky. Law Rep. 1020, 33 S.W.
416 (1895); Williams v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 830, 81 S.W. (2d)
891 (1935); Marion v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 729, 108 S.W. (2nd)
721 (1937).
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held that the facts warranted a ruling that as a matter of law the
burning of the building was the proximate cause of the death of
the occupant. The court further said that the death of the child was
foreseeable in that the act was dangerous to life, and the appellant
knew the house was occupied. 3
Let us consider a hypothetical situation in connection with the
present case. X lives in a shack at the outskirts of Lexington. A
and B are prominent citizens and feel that the ramshackle shack is a
disgrace to the community. They go to X's shack under the cover of
night with intent to burn it. They search the shack upon arrival and
find no one but X, whom they tie to a tree outside before setting fire
to the building. Y, an arch criminal, has dug a tunnel from X's
sback to the Z bank vault unknown to X, and as he is being chased
through the tunnel by the police comes out into the shack soon after
the fire is kindled. Y realizes that the shack is on fire but decides
to take a chance on burning to death rather than to face sure capture
by turning back. Y is burned to death. Would the Kentucky Court
of Appeals sustain a conviction of A and B for murder? In no ease
the writer found has the court been faced with such a problem, as
the facts in the cases reviewed have all justified a ruling that as a
matter of law the death of the victim was the necessary or natural
consequence of the dangerous felony. The writer believes that the
conduct of A and B would not warrant a conviction of murder because
the utmost precaution was exercised in committing the felony. It is
submitted that in the above hypothetical case the court would charge
the jury to determine whether the death of Y' was the necessary or
natural consequence of the commission of the felony.
It is further submitted that the Kentucky Court is in accord
with the theory set forth in a recent note on he felony murder
doctrine. In this note the writer states that the felony murder doctrine Is outmoded and that the courts in reality have done away
with its usefulness by inserting into it the element of proximate
cause.4 The writer of the note comes to the conclusion that the convictions could well be based on the negligent murder doctrine.5
In a complementary note an attempt was made to distinguish the
two doctrines on the ground that under the felony murder rule the
courts always as a matter of law held that the commission of the
8
dangerous felony was the cause of the resulting death. Apparently
the Kentucky Court does not consider this distinction to be valid
because the court in the instant case says that the element of proximate cause must be satisfied, but that in the present case reasonable
men could not differ as to whether or not the death of the occupant
was the necessary or natural consequence of the arson.7
3278 Ky. 111, 114, 128 S.W. (2d) 208, 210 (1939).
4
Note (1940) 28 Ky. L.J. 215.
Banks v. State, 85 Texas cr. Rep. 165, 211 S.W. 217 (1919).
"Note (1940) 28 Ky. L.J. 218.
S278 Ky. 111, 114, 128 S.W. (2d) 208, 210 (1939).
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In conclusion, it is submitted that the felony murder doctrine
in Kentucky is based on the same principles as the negligent murder
doctrine, since to convict a defendant of murder for a death occuring
during the commission of a felony there must first be a felony
dangerous to life and, secondly, the death of the victim must be the
necessary or natural consequence of the felony.
J. GRiANVILLE CLARK

CRIMINAL LAW-CONSPIRACY AND THE FELONY MURDER
DOCTRINE IN KENTUCKY*
Defendant was indicted jointly with two others for the crime of
wilful murder by setting fire to a house and burning a child to death.
The evidence showed that defendant was not near enough to aid and
abet in the crime. Conviction was accordingly obtained under an
instruction on conspiracy. Defendant appealed contending, inter aZia,
that the court erred in not submitting to the jury the question of
whether the killing of the child was the natural and probable consequence of the burning of the house and therefore within the purpose of
the conspiracy. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, holding
that there was no doubt that the death of the child was the natural consequence of burning the house; and that therefore it was not necessary
for the conspiracy instruction to submit this question for the determination of the jury. Whitfield v. Commonwealth, 278 Ky. 111, 128
S.W. (2d) 208 (1939).
According to the modern conception of the felony murder doctrine,
a conviction of murder will be sustained when a homicide occurs at
the hands of the felon during the perpetration of a felony such as
arson, robbery, rape, burglary, or Other felony which involves a substantial risk to human life.' Whether the homicide was a natural and
probable consequence 2 of the commission of the felony Is seldom considered by the courts.
A summary investigation of the instant case might lead one to
conclude that Kentucky has modified the felony murder doctrine and
now permits a conviction of murder only when the homicide Is the
natural and probable consequence of the perpekration of the particular
3
felony. In order to ascertain the truth or falsity of that conclusion
it will be necessary to review briefly the Kentucky decisions relating to
felony murder.
* This comment is written in conjunction with the one immediately
preceding. The same case is considered in both. The writers reach
different conclusions.-Ed.
I See Arent & MacDonald, The Felony Murder Doctrine and Its
Application Under the New York Statutes (1935) 20 Cornell L. Q. 288,
291; 2 Note (1940) 28 Ky. L. J. 218.
Notes (1940) 28 Ky. L. J. 215, 216; 28 Ky. L. J. 218, 221 n. 11.
See also Arent & MacDonald, supra n. 1, at 309.
3See Companion Note (1940) 29 Ky. L. J. 197.

